By Ira Regmi 

The early fall air in Columbia University’s graduate policy school bristled with murmurs and sighs of curious, disheartened, eager, and opinionated students devotedly debating the issues of the world. The summer of 2019 was one of unremitting global tension with waves of discontent in Hong Kong, and Kashmir, the British government’s loss of confidence, and the burning Amazon. 

I walked into a group of inquisitive colleagues barraging an Indian student with questions on the abrogation of the special status awarded to Kashmir, the only Muslim majority state in the otherwise overwhelmingly Hindu India. They listened intently and granted authority to her statements. I stood there in vain, expecting a “Hey, Nepal is surrounded by India on three sides, what do you as a Nepali think?” 

It did not cross anybody’s mind to wonder what a neighboring country’s opinion was. This lack of curiosity meant that Nepal’s opinion was unimportant, and the country was not a stakeholder to the issue. It was odd that until I walked away from the discussion, I too felt irrelevant to the subject. I, too, deemed the Indian opinion relevant, and mine worthless. This feeling is, in a way, emblematic of South Asian geopolitics. 

The Indian narrative has always dominated South Asia. This stems out of a paradox that plagues us – the region has been globally irrelevant, while India has not. It is, therefore, a matter of convenience for international organizations, who cannot afford to ignore India, to simply club together the socio-economic and political contexts of the region and represent it with an Indian illustration. 

This incident crystallized a thought that has always lingered in my subconscious - I as a Nepali had no standing in my own regional affairs because as a global community, we have not made space for a non-Indian South Asian narrative. It was shocking to me that even during standoffs between India and Pakistan or India and China, there was no global media coverage on the possible fate of other South Asian countries. 

While to some, it might merely be an issue of semantics, this assimilation of South Asian and Indian identity has dire consequences to both India and the region as a whole. The popularization of India’s narrative beguiles and lends legitimacy to India’s bullying of smaller countries. 

India occupies several Nepali territories around the border and builds embarkments and barrages that cause continuous flooding in Nepal. Historically, the Indian involvement in the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, indoctrination, and training of an extremist organization in Sri Lanka are some examples of Indian oppression in the region. 

India evades any criticism because these issues never get space in global platforms as we assign the entire South Asian share, almost solely to India. India denies almost all suspected involvements in the region, and smaller countries don’t hold enough authority to convince the world of otherwise. It is a sad truth that smaller countries in smaller regions of the world live in the shadows of regional superpowers, bullied and muted.

These muted voices, if heard, tell stories of an inherently authoritarian Indian state which may help better understand India’s position on Kashmir. Nepali Congressperson, Pradip Giri said in a statement in the Nepali parliament “India gulped Kashmir as it gulped Sikkim” drawing a parallel to the Indian occupation of Sikkim in 1975. This fear of India ‘gulping states’ is widespread in Nepal. Nepalis, for decades, have advocated for political stability, and strong leadership’ fearing that if Nepal does not hold itself together “India le Nepal khanchha” meaning “India will eat Nepal.” 

It is in this light that my liberal like-minded Indian friends and I differ. The Indian occupation of Kashmir, human rights violations in the region, and the majoritarian Indian support for this move does not shock me as it shocks my peers. This is simply a replication of India’s attitude towards other countries in South Asia onto its own people. Before the rise of the majoritarian BJP government, in the game of me vs. you, me was India, and you were smaller countries in the region. The only difference now is that the ‘me’ is Hindus and the ‘you’ is everybody else, even if they are within India.

In 2014, the BJP government defeated incumbent Congress Party, under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Mr. Modi is a controversial figure who holds associations with the extremist, right-wing, and largely anti-Muslim RSS party. He was also alleged of allowing the massacre of the Muslim minority in riots that broke out in Gujarat in 2002, under his tenure as the Chief Minister.  

While some liberals have always been skeptical of Mr. Modi, he enjoys widespread majoritarian support in the country. After being re-elected in 2019, the anti-Muslim wave culminated into the sudden occupation of Kashmir with restrictions on communication, and mobility. 

Nepal was also first to face the wrath of Prime Minister Modi in 2015, with an informal blockade that prevented the flow of daily necessities and relief supplies for earthquake victims. Mr. Modi attempted to pressure Nepal into preserving its status quo as a Hindu state. He also meant to coerce Nepal into complying by the demands of greater autonomy of a particular ethnic group that shares similarities with the Indian population across the open border and also shares geographic proximity. 

While the Indian government denies these claims, Indian and Nepali media coverage, local voices, and historical precedents suggest otherwise. A recent book by a former RAW (Indian Intelligence Agency) suggests that a similar strategy was adopted during the 1970s to topple the monarchy in Nepal. 

For a tiny, landlocked country in South Asia, that has historically been repeatedly betrayed by its ‘big brother,’ this recent assertion of Hindu identity is merely an extension of their imposition of an Indian identity to the rest of South Asia.

Ira Regmi is a second-year MIA - EPD student at SIPA. She is from Nepal and has studied and worked in India for over 7 years. She most recently worked as a financial journalist at Standard & Poors and is currently an intern in the second UN committee with the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan.