By Ipsita Dash

7.8 on the Richter Scale, touching IX/X on the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale — the twin earthquakes in Gaziantep and Kahramanmaras were ruinous, if not disastrous. Death, injury and devastation, hitherto recorded and reported as the worst in Turkey in 100 years, made the earthquakes the fifth-largest natural disaster in the century and the deadliest since 2010. The suffering, fear of multiple after-shocks, slow rescue process and uncertain pace of recovery form part of the tragic trail that the tectonic event leaves.

The misfortune is accentuated by several human factors, including war, which has destabilized preparedness efforts, made rescue work more difficult in politically volatile Syria, and led to cries of racism from Syrian refugee camps in Turkey.

To the list of human follies, one would be tempted to add President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s post-site declaration that it was “not possible to be prepared for such a disaster.” To a student and follower of public policy, the President’s declaration is the abnegation of responsibility in the face of grave human tragedy. Worse, it represents a denial of responsibility for the future. The merits of the statement and its implications can be discussed in the seismotectonic context, the humanitarian and viable habitability context and the policy-making context.

Plates are not getting any younger. There is no way we can maintain or refurbish them. The upper mantle of Earth is in many ways like the human brain in terms of inaccessibility. In scope and capacity for intervention and repair, it is worse than the human brain. These are truisms.

But it is a seismogenic area with a large fault zone. The crisscrossing East and North Anatolian fault zones are facts of Turkey’s existence, as are recurrent earthquakes throughout history from Antakya in 115 AD. The Seismic Hazard Map for Turkey was revised as recently as in 2018. The most recent quake recording of more than 7.0 on the Richter Scale was as proximate as October 2020.

Ironically, the 2023 Turkey-Syria earthquake was even predicted three days earlier by a Dutch researcher. Clearly, seismic monitoring tools are refined and available, and the administration could take notice.

As far as the viable habitability issue is concerned, the extent of loss of human lives, livelihood and property is not a direct function of the intensity of the earthquake. The strength of shaking at particular locations depends as much on the magnitude at the epicenter as on the soil dynamics of the surrounding geography and the associated earthquake engineering. That’s why a quake measuring 9.0 can cause 16,000 deaths in Japan (2011) whereas one measuring 7.0 can cause 220,000 deaths in Haiti (2010).

This is a reflection on the differential policy rigor and engineering readiness between the two events and countries. As far as Turkey and the twin cities are concerned, building typologies are characterized by brick structures, unreinforced masonry, low-rise frames and congestion. Even a 6.5 scale event would mean severe to heavy damage in Gaziantep.

This takes us to the third context: the need for the consequent public policy to be responsible and effective. Given the frequent tryst with earthquakes, there have been many administration attempts throughout history, especially after the 1939 Erzincan and 1999 Izmit earthquakes, to put in place disaster readiness regulations. The National Disaster and Emergency Management Authority and the National Disaster Response Plans have followed. Turkish citizens have even paid an Earthquake Tax since 1999 that levied an estimated US $4.6 billion.

But regulations for strengthening strict building codes have been impacted by insincere implementation and alleged fraud. The expansive plans have come a cropper. Even the tax the citizens have paid has been utilized in questionable ways such as to fund infrastructure like roads and railways. While the major urban locations have seen some progress in implementing building codes, the smaller, poorer geographies have received scant attention. The damage was widespread, but poor locations were hit the most.

Because of the crossroad at which Turkey finds itself again, there is a need for the administration to be humane, concerted, and responsible. Plates cannot be controlled below the crust, but policies and their resolute implementation can be.

Ipsita Dash (MPA '23) is an Environmental Science and Policy student at SIPA. She enjoys writing topical editorial pieces for Indian papers and journals.

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