Can China and Russia Reconcile Their Differences to Develop the Northern Sea Route?
(Photo/UW_News/Map_of_the_Arctic_region_showing_the_Northeast_Passage,_the_Northern_Sea_Route_and_Northwest_Passage,_and_bathymetry_NOAA)
by Campbell Clarke
The War in Ukraine has served to strengthen the strategic partnership between Russia and China in the Arctic, raising concerns regarding the future of regional governance. A series of political and legal limitations will likely restrict both states from forming an exclusive partnership to develop the Northern Sea Route, suggesting that the potential threat posed by their relationship is likely less of a threat to Arctic stability than what one might otherwise assume.
Popular perceptions of the Arctic often depict the region as a remote tract of sea, snow and rock that is transfixed in time – as a foreboding landmass shaped by nature and heroic narratives that are rooted in the expeditions of explorers. In reality, however, the region above the Arctic Circle – located at 66° 33’ N – has emerged as a key arena for geopolitical competition. China, in particular, has attempted to assert its authority in Arctic affairs to secure its diplomatic, security, and economic interests, especially as climate change improves access to the rich resources of the region.
While China aspires to participate in governance forums like the Arctic Council and conduct scientific research in the region, it is primarily interested in exploiting energy resources, mining rare earth metals, and accessing maritime shipping routes.
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is strategically significant in this regard because it serves as a maritime shipping route that is between 30 and 50 percent shorter than traditional corridors – such as the Strait of Malacca or Suez Canal – used for transporting goods manufactured in China to markets in Europe and North America. Crucially, the NSR can also help Chinese companies mitigate the Malacca Dilemma – an economic security threat that might arise due to a naval blockade in the Indian Ocean – and reduce pertinent political and environmental risks that might jeopardize the efficacy of traditional trade routes such as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal and the Strait of Hormuz.
Although the NSR currently lacks sufficient shipping infrastructure to support large quantities of trade, and ice conditions prevent ships from traversing the sea route for many months each year, recent research suggests that the NSR will become commercially viable sometime between 2040 and 2065. Recognizing that climate change might provide an opportunity to diversify its maritime trade routes and secure reliable sources of energy, China has attempted to collaborate with, and invest in, Russia to realize its regional economic objectives. In fact, China has invested approximately USD $90 billion into infrastructure and energy extraction projects in the Russian Arctic – such as Yamal LNG and Yamal LNG-2 – in an attempt to exert its economic influence in the region.
Despite these efforts, Russia has historically sought to limit China’s presence in the region and restrict its participation in regional governance regimes because of the economic, strategic and security significance of the Arctic. Relatedly, other Arctic states – which include Canada, the United States, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Finland, Iceland and Sweden – have enacted foreign direct investment screening laws to block or restrict Chinese investments in industries identified as critical to their national security interests. These restrictions are particularly problematic for China because it lacks sovereign jurisdiction in the Arctic, and must therefore rely on partnerships with Arctic states to exploit the economic opportunities that are emerging in the area.
In 2014, however, Moscow turned to Beijing to overcome a series of sanctions that were implemented in response to Russia’s occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, which allowed it to acquire the technical expertise and capital needed to develop the petrochemical production projects on which its economy depends. Similarly, the Russo-Ukrainian War has driven Russia to deepen its commercial partnership with China in order to sustain its domestic economy and develop the NSR. The recent accession of Finland and Sweden into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has also served to solidify the geopolitical divide between Russia and the West, motivating Moscow to strengthen its strategic and commercial partnership with Beijing.
Some analysts have interpreted the emerging partnership between both states as a highly alarming prospect that might leave the region without rules and order, while others have described these developments as factors contributing to a contemporary Arctic Great Game. Although we must continue to critically examine how the partnership between both states progresses in the Arctic, it is equally important not to overemphasize the strength of the Sino-Russian relationship in the region and the potential risks that are associated with it. A series of legal and political limitations will likely prevent China and Russia from forming an exclusive strategic partnership or political pact to collaboratively develop the NSR in the medium-to-long term, meaning the partnership between both states is less likely to threaten the stability of the region than what one might otherwise assume.
Consider the different perspectives pertaining to the legal status of the NSR that China and Russia possess. While both states ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), Russia has also adopted a litany of domestic laws in an attempt to extend its jurisdiction over the NSR.
Although Russia recognizes that the NSR includes waters with different legal statuses, it also views the passage as a historically-established, national transportation route over which it ought to exercise authority, and contends that key sections of the sea route represent internal waters that should be subject to a single set of shipping regulations.
Under the Rules for Navigation in the NSR, which rely on Article 234 of UNCLOS, commercial and military vessels from foreign states must comply with detailed administrative requirements and obtain permission from national authorities to enter certain sections of the shipping route. Because foreign vessels sailing through a state’s territorial seas enjoy the right of innocent passage under UNCLOS, some scholars suggest that such strident restrictions violate international legal norms pertaining to transit passage and will, therefore, complicate relations between both states as China assumes an increasingly prominent role in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.
If China continues to leverage its superior economic and political position to dictate the terms of trade in the Russian Arctic, the state will inevitably need to explicitly respect Russia’s legal regime or adopt a position that clarifies its intention to uphold international legal norms. The former contradicts the official maritime policy that China currently pursues – both in the Arctic and abroad – and would undermine its ability to cooperate with other Arctic states, while the latter would likely provoke an antagonistic response from Russia.
Russia also aims to diversify its potential partners in the Arctic to reduce the risk of becoming economically and politically dependent on a single state. Some political officials have discussed opportunities with the Government of India to establish an Eastern Maritime Corridor to connect the NSR to the Indian Ocean, and others have expressed interest in collaborating with the United Arab Emirates and BRICS to develop regional shipping routes.
While it is impossible to precisely predict how the emerging partnership between China and Russia will progress in the Arctic, these limitations will likely prevent an exclusive partnership between both states from forming. Rather than assuming that both powers possess identical objectives and approaches in the area, it is crucial to acknowledge the distinct differences inherent in their aspirations and activities. Doing so might allow policymakers to effectively navigate the nuanced state of affairs in the Arctic, promote productive diplomacy, and prevent tensions from escalating unnecessarily.
Campbell Clarke (GSAS ’24) studies environmental and legal history at Columbia University and is a columnist at The Morningside Post. Originally from Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada, Campbell comes from a background in international business and economics, and his interests lie at the intersection of climate change, geopolitics and international law. His current research explores the manifold ways in which climate change affects the efficacy of international treaties that are intended to regulate resources that transcend national boundaries.